The risk of democratic backsliding Is no longer distant

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The risk of democratic backsliding Is no longer distant

Published: 23 Sep. 2025, 00:01

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Kang Won-taek

The author is a professor of political science and international relations at Seoul National University.

The Democratic Party traces its origins to 1955, when politicians opposed to the so-called Sasaoip amendment — a 1954 constitutional revision that controversially “rounded up” one missing vote in the National Assembly to allow President Syngman Rhee to seek indefinite re-election — founded a new party. Since then, its name has shifted many times with the changing of political tides, but with rare exceptions, such as the Uri Party, it has always carried the word “democratic.” The idea of democracy has thus stood at the core of the party’s identity and served as its most prized justification for power.

Today, however, the party’s actions are raising concerns that it could undermine democracy rather than protect it.

President Lee Jae Myung delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the 2025 International Political Science Association World Congress at Coex in Gangnam District, southern Seoul, on July 13. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

What alarms observers is how closely the Democratic Party’s recent behavior resembles patterns found in countries where democracy has eroded. The most common sign of democratic backsliding is a sustained assault on the judiciary. When a ruling party gains overwhelming control of the legislature and executive, it often moves to weaken the courts.

Tactics range from “court packing” — increasing the number of justices and filling the seats with allies — to “court curbing,” such as reducing the authority of existing courts, creating parallel tribunals, or altering judicial appointment and evaluation procedures. These strategies were implemented in countries such as Venezuela, Turkey and Hungary, all of which experienced democratic declines.

The parallels to Korea are troubling. The Democratic Party has openly criticized the Supreme Court chief justice, pursued the creation of a special tribunal on insurrection that bypasses established courts, and floated proposals to expand the number of justices while introducing political party involvement in judicial evaluations. Such moves closely mirror actions taken abroad. They are often justified by citing crises — a failed coup attempt, severe economic hardship or threats to national security. Korea’s current circumstances are not so different. Proposals to rein in the press through punitive damages also echo measures used in backsliding states.

In the past, democracy collapsed through dramatic shocks such as military coups or mass uprisings. Today, as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt note in “How Democracies Die” (2018), erosion is more gradual, harder to detect, and sometimes even legal. It is not only the reckless declaration of emergency rule by former president Yoon Suk Yeol that endangers democracy. Attempts by the ruling party to reshape the judiciary in its favor by dismantling checks and balances pose a similar threat.

It defies common sense to call it a healthy democracy when one party controls the presidency — already criticized for “imperial” power — alongside a legislature strong enough to pass laws, approve budgets and impeach officials without hesitation, and then extends its reach to the courts. If the Democratic Party succeeds in pushing through its current proposals, Korea could soon be downgraded by global watchdogs such as the Varieties of Democracy Institute or the Economist Intelligence Unit, which track and assess democratic quality worldwide.

Regardless of the political justification or claims that the steps follow legal procedures, the harmful consequences for democracy are measured against universal standards. Such a downgrade would tarnish national pride in having achieved both economic growth and democratization. It would also weaken the country’s standing in international diplomacy, culture and business. Ultimately, democratic regression and reputational decline would leave the Lee Jae Myung administration facing both domestic accountability and a harsh historical verdict.

Supreme Court Chief Justice Jo Hee-de, under mounting pressure to resign from the ruling Democratic Party, arrives at the Supreme Court in Seocho District, southern Seoul, on Sept. 16. [YONHAP]

Korea’s political history shows that attempts at excessive concentration of power inevitably trigger resistance from the public. The Democratic Party, more than anyone, should recognize this.

On July 13, President Lee addressed thousands of political scientists from around the world at the International Political Science Association congress in Seoul. He spoke with pride about Korean democracy and its resilience. He emphasized that in times of crisis, democracy must return to its fundamental principles. That principle is correct. The essence of democracy lies in checks and balances among institutions, with a particular emphasis on the independence of the judiciary and the press.

The Democratic Party should return to its own foundational principle of defending democracy. To safeguard the fragile but hard-won system that Korea revived in past crises, the Lee administration must exercise restraint and caution in wielding power.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.