North Korea's participation in China's Victory Day ceremony highlights shifting diplomatic landscape
Published: 29 Aug. 2025, 16:52
Updated: 31 Aug. 2025, 19:13
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
![From left: North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin [JOONGANG ILBO]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/08/31/6b81a8f8-7047-4dd2-9b76-9d19fab66e82.jpg)
From left: North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin [JOONGANG ILBO]
[NEWS ANALYSIS]
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin are set to meet for the first time together in Beijing on Sept. 3, when they attend China’s Victory Day ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in World War II.
The gathering of the three leaders comes just after President Lee Jae Myung’s visits to Japan and the United States, where he held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and U.S. President Donald Trump. The North Korea-China-Russia summit is being widely interpreted as a revival of Cold War–style confrontation between the southern triangle of South Korea, the United States and Japan against the northern triangle of North Korea, China and the former Soviet Union.
Pyongyang, Beijing improve ties
Beijing and Pyongyang simultaneously announced Thursday that Kim would attend the Victory Day event. At a press conference held at the Victory Day media center, Hong Lei, assistant foreign minister of China, named Kim immediately after Putin while listing the 26 leaders confirmed to attend.
While detailed schedules have not yet been disclosed, the announcement raises the possibility of not only bilateral talks but also a trilateral summit between Kim, Xi and Putin.
Xi’s decision to host Kim and Putin side by side at an event he has carefully prepared underscores Beijing’s return as the central axis of a North Korea-China-Russia alignment, abandoning its earlier distance from what some analysts labeled the “rogue alliance” between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Facing heightened tensions with Washington across virtually all sectors — from tariffs to geopolitics — Beijing appears to have concluded that consolidating its traditional anti-U.S. partners serves its strategic interests.
![Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un pose for a photo during a signing ceremony of the new partnership in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. [AP/YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/08/31/5726c2d6-8395-4d65-a624-9ad61c1a62bd.jpg)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un pose for a photo during a signing ceremony of the new partnership in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19, 2024. [AP/YONHAP]
For Putin, engaged in a standoff with Trump over talks to end the war in Ukraine, the symbolism is also valuable. Kim also has strong incentives to move closer to China: with his utility to Russia likely to wane after the war, economic ties with China are crucial to fulfilling his five-year economic and military development plan, which runs through the end of this year.
“China, which is under heightened pressure, wants to demonstrate its influence over the Korean Peninsula, while North Korea seeks a propaganda victory by highlighting its alignment with the two superpowers and Russia needs to maintain its ties with China amid the war in Ukraine,” said Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University. “Their strategic interests converged on the Sept. 3 Victory Day.”
Analysts suggest that Seoul’s closer trilateral coordination with Washington and Tokyo under the Lee administration may have factored into the North Korea-China-Russia decision to emphasize their bloc. With Korea-Japan ties no longer the “weak link,” Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang may see confrontation as a more effective way to pressure Seoul.
Seoul had already learned of Kim’s planned participation through diplomatic channels before the South Korea-U.S. summit. Presidential chief of staff Kang Hoon-sik said the development “should be interpreted as part of the same trend” that made the summit a success.
![North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, speaks to officials during his visit to a special operations training base on Aug. 27. [KCNA]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/08/31/fdd09697-3b9a-40d1-a3de-9d01a32b8a09.jpg)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, speaks to officials during his visit to a special operations training base on Aug. 27. [KCNA]
Kim Jong-un’s multilateral debut
For Kim, attendance at the Victory Day ceremony marks his debut on a multilateral diplomatic stage. While he has previously visited China, Russia, Singapore and Vietnam, those were bilateral engagements.
By breaking with his father’s and grandfather’s avoidance of such multilateral settings, Kim is signaling greater diplomatic confidence, bolstered by Russia’s backing.
In addition to North Korea and Russia, leaders from Cambodia, Vietnam and 23 other countries are expected. For Kim, the event could serve to bolster recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. If Beijing reciprocates by sending a senior envoy to Pyongyang for the Oct. 10 Workers’ Party founding anniversary, Kim could showcase his domestic and international standing.
“Kim, who until now has mostly relied on official statements in state media, is stepping up as a main player, signaling his intent to actively shape the diplomatic stage,” said Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader’s sister and a senior party official, suggested on Aug. 19 during a foreign ministry meeting that Pyongyang sees itself as the focal point of an emerging regional diplomatic axis.
Park Ihn-hwi, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University, said Kim’s first multilateral appearance is aimed at “securing legitimacy as the leader of a normal state and carving out space within the anti-Western bloc known as the Global South,” linking it to Pyongyang’s domestic narrative of treating South Korea as a separate, hostile state.
![North Korean leader Kim Jong-un departs Pyongyang for Hanoi for his second summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 23, 2019. Kim waves to well-wishers during a send-off ceremony at Pyongyang Station. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/08/31/82346538-e14c-4a3a-a434-318cbe2ec5f7.jpg)
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un departs Pyongyang for Hanoi for his second summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 23, 2019. Kim waves to well-wishers during a send-off ceremony at Pyongyang Station. [YONHAP]
Seoul’s outreach put to the test
The development is a setback for President Lee, who had proposed himself as a “pacemaker” for dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang at the Korea-U.S. summit last week. Kim’s decision to side with China and Russia instead of responding positively to Seoul’s overtures suggests a further decline in prospects for inter-Korean dialogue or U.S.-North Korea talks.
Im Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, called Kim’s appearance “a signal that reduces the possibility of improved inter-Korean relations or a U.S.-North Korea summit.”
Seoul’s Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told Yonhap News TV on Friday that Seoul will “continue working closely with China and other relevant countries to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table,” stressing that “the ultimate goal remains denuclearization.”
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY CHUNG YEONG-GYO, PARK HYUN-JU [[email protected]]
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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