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Trump’s tariff shock raises doubts about U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy

Published: 27 Aug. 2025, 00:04

Cha Se-hyeon

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Since 2005, when the George W. Bush administration elevated ties with India to a strategic partnership, Washington has treated the country as central to its global strategy. India, the world’s most populous nation and the fourth largest economy, has been the cornerstone of what analysts once described as America’s “strategic altruism.” That principle held that supporting India’s growth would serve long-term U.S. interests.

With Donald Trump back in the White House, that framework is being shaken. Experts argue that Washington’s strategic altruism toward India is giving way to a blunt America First agenda.

A handout photo made available by the Press Information Bureau (PIB) showing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during their meeting in New Delhi, India, August 19, 2025. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is on the two days state visit to Inida. [EPA/YONHAP]

In the latest tariff negotiations, the United States imposed duties on Indian goods at a level harsher than those applied to China. While China accepted a tentative 30 percent tariff, India faces 50 percent tariffs, including 25 percent in reciprocal measures. Washington also strengthened cooperation with Pakistan, India’s rival, after New Delhi resisted U.S. demands to open its markets and halt imports of Russian oil. In response, India has begun leaning toward closer coordination with China and Russia. This shift raises the possibility of an Indo-Pacific strategy without India, even as the country competes with Beijing for naval influence in the Indian Ocean.

The concept of strategic altruism was rooted in the belief that a stronger India would benefit the United States by opening markets for U.S. companies, bolstering deterrence against China, and spreading democratic influence across Asia. Both Republican and Democratic administrations embraced the approach, and it held even during Trump’s first term.

India, however, has always pursued a policy of nonalignment since its independence in 1947. After the Cold War, this evolved into a principle of diversified partnerships and avoidance of binding military alliances. New Delhi worked closely with Washington while maintaining ties with Moscow and building solidarity with countries such as Brazil and South Africa. The United States accepted this balancing act, recognizing India’s geopolitical weight in the Indo-Pacific.

Trump’s return to office has upended the arrangement. India has long maintained high tariffs to protect domestic manufacturing and agriculture and to manage its trade balance. Washington, facing a trade deficit with India of about $50 billion in 2024, demanded that New Delhi reduce tariff barriers, increase purchases of American weapons and energy, and expand access for U.S. farm products. Talks initially appeared constructive, but deadlocked when India resisted agricultural concessions and refused to scale back surging Russian oil imports following the war in Ukraine.

Tensions escalated in May when Trump claimed credit for brokering a cease-fire between India and Pakistan after military clashes. India has traditionally rejected outside mediation in its disputes with Pakistan, but Washington sided with Islamabad, which had accepted the U.S. proposal. In July, Trump went further, signing a cooperation agreement with Pakistan on oil development.

Analysts see this as a sharp departure. Milan Vaishnav, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in Foreign Affairs in July that Trump and his aides now operate on a conviction that allies and partners have taken advantage of the United States. As a result, he said, few in Washington still regard India as an indispensable counterweight to China.

Happymon Jacob, editor of “India’s World,” argued in an August column that Trump seems content to negotiate with China and Russia, pressure traditional allies, and accelerate the emergence of a G2 system dominated by Washington and Beijing. In such a world, he warned, India’s geopolitical significance would inevitably shrink. Unlike previous U.S. leaders, he wrote, Trump’s administration is asking, “What can India really do for America?”

Faced with a weakening U.S. commitment, India is shoring up its multilateral approach. New Delhi has moved to deepen cooperation with Moscow while also exploring rapprochement with Beijing. China has responded positively.

India and China fought a war in 1962 over their contested border and continue to face each other across the 3,488-kilometer Line of Actual Control. Relations hit their lowest point after deadly clashes in the Himalayas in 2020. Yet paradoxically, U.S. tariff pressure has provided an incentive for dialogue.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to visit China at the end of August to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, his first trip there in seven years. He is expected to meet President Xi Jinping and also hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Modi and Putin will appear together again at Moscow’s Sept. 3 parade marking the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a family photo ceremony prior to the BRICS Summit plenary session in Kazan, Russia, Wednesday, Oct. 23, 2024. [REUTERS/YONHAP]

During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi in mid-August, the two sides agreed to resume direct flights for the first time in five years and expand trade and investment. According to Beijing, Modi emphasized that 2025 marks the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties, saying cooperation between India and China is inseparable from the arrival of an “Asian century.” His remarks were widely interpreted as a pointed message to Washington.

China has also openly backed India against U.S. tariffs. Xu Feihong, Beijing’s ambassador to India, said at a think tank event on August 21 that China “firmly opposes” Washington’s threat to impose duties of up to 50 percent on Indian goods. “Silence or compromise in the face of such behavior will only embolden the bully,” he said.

The developments underscore how Trump’s tariff-driven policies risk undermining the very Indo-Pacific framework Washington has sought to build. If India continues to drift away, the strategy may face an existential test.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.