Constitutional reform? First fix presidential pardons

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Constitutional reform? First fix presidential pardons

Published: 27 Aug. 2025, 00:05

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Park Jin-seok

The author is the editor of the investigative reporting bureau at the JoongAng Ilbo.

In late 2003, two groups of Koreans — 163 legal experts and 250 members of the public — sat with surveys in hand, pondering four blunt questions. Were presidential pardons legitimate? Had they become a tool to free corrupt politicians and business figures? Did they undermine legal equality? Were they granted too frequently?

The questions seemed almost insolent, challenging the president’s power of clemency. Yet, the survey had been commissioned by the government itself. During the first year of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the Ministry of Justice asked the Korean Institute of Criminology, now the Korean Institute of Criminology and Justice, to conduct the study.

Justice Minister Chung Sung-ho announces the list of special pardons for Liberation Day at the Government Complex Seoul in Jongno District on Aug. 11. [YONHAP]

Presidential pardon authority is often described as “imperial,” among the most sweeping of executive powers. It can nullify court judgments in an instant, resembling what one commentator likened to a “magic ring” or “Thanos’ snap.” Originating in the privileges of monarchs, it was written into Korea’s first Constitution in 1948 as Article 79. It has endured on the rationale that pardons can serve as a last safeguard against miscarriages of justice.

But the utility of such power has largely faded. Korea is no longer an era of systemic judicial abuse producing widespread wrongful convictions. Instead, pardons have too often become political and economic bargaining chips, provoking public backlash. Discontent peaked in late 2002 with the final pardons of the Kim Dae-jung government.

Roh, who positioned himself as a reform-minded leader, at least attempted to address the problem. Under Justice Minister Kang Kum-sil, the ministry pursued revisions to the pardon law. The survey results aligned closely with public sentiment. Among legal experts, 74 percent called previous pardons unjustified. Eighty-seven percent said they had been used to rescue corrupt politicians, while 95 percent said they had been granted too often. The general public also registered majority disapproval.

The institute drew on these findings and international precedents to publish a report titled “The Status and Reassessment of the Pardon System,” authored by Jung Hyun-mi and Hwang Ji-tae. Its key recommendation was to restrict pardons for crimes such as constitutional disruption — treason, rebellion or sedition — along with election violations, corruption cases and crimes against humanity.

Yet, the report languished. Only near the end of Roh’s presidency did a watered-down reform bill pass the National Assembly. From the original recommendations, only the establishment of a Pardon Review Committee survived. It was difficult to portray this as a landmark change in Korean constitutional history.

Still, Roh’s administration at least tried. Later, governments treated the issue with indifference. Pardons became routine, frequent and increasingly brazen. Over time, even the minimal boundaries of restraint eroded.

That is why the most recent round of pardons was striking. As the first amnesty of the new administration, it nonetheless included inappropriate political figures such as former Justice Minister Cho Kuk and former Democratic Party lawmaker Yoon Mee-hyang. Critics condemned the move as shameless, but the government showed little concern, counting on public memory to fade. Within a year, it will likely proceed with another round of controversial pardons, then dig in against criticism.

At this stage, the problem is no longer about individual cases. The deeper question is whether the institution of pardons itself requires fundamental reform. On Aug. 13, the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning unveiled priorities for the new government, placing constitutional revision at the top. After the Dec. 3 martial law crisis, demands for reform have surged, with a focus on reducing the president’s imperial powers. Few powers are more imperial than the authority to pardon.

Cho Kuk, former head of the Rebuilding Korea Party, walks out of the Seoul Southern Detention Center in Guro District early on Aug. 15 after being granted a special pardon and reinstatement in the first such measure by the Lee Jae Myung administration. [NEWS1]

The cleanest solution would be to amend Article 79 of the Constitution, which enshrines presidential pardons. If that proves politically burdensome, the ongoing constitutional reform process could at least revive debate over the pardon law. There is no need to start from scratch. The recommendations of the Korean Institute of Criminology from more than 20 years ago remain relevant. If implemented, they would automatically exclude most of the figures who have repeatedly appeared on pardon lists.

Such changes would also spare presidential aides from having to voice peculiar complaints that “the president suffers the most damage from granting pardons to politicians,” as senior political secretary Woo Sang-ho once remarked. Structural reform, rather than ad hoc outrage, would restore credibility to Korea’s justice system.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.