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President Lee faces a master negotiator in Trump

Published: 14 Aug. 2025, 00:01

Chang Duk-jin

The author is a sociology professor at Seoul National University.

If there were a Nobel Prize for practical economics alongside the theoretical award, U.S. President Donald Trump would likely be its first recipient. The theoretical prize recognizes scholars who produce groundbreaking ideas, while a practical prize would go to those who skillfully apply existing theories in real-world settings. Since taking office, Trump has repeatedly drawn on concepts from game theory and behavioral economics, demonstrating an ability to translate these into tangible negotiating outcomes.

The agenda for the Aug. 25 South Korea-U.S. summit is packed with issues that favor Washington more than Seoul. Topics include the conclusion of tariff negotiations, defense cost-sharing, U.S. troop realignment, Korea’s role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at countering China, and the North Korean nuclear issue. The tariff talks ended at a 15 percent rate, which can be viewed as a partial success for Seoul, but Japan and Switzerland’s past experiences show such results can erode quickly. On defense spending, U.S. officials have suggested raising South Korea’s contribution by as much as tenfold, despite a cost-sharing agreement ratified last year. Meanwhile, Washington’s plan to relocate an estimated 4,500 troops from the peninsula to bolster strategic flexibility appears difficult to reverse.

People watch a TV screen showing a file image of President Lee Jae Myung, left, and U.S. President Donald Trump during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul on Aug. 12. The signs read, ″The presidential office announced that the South Korea-U.S. summit will be held on the 25th.″ [AP/YONHAP]

Trump’s history with North Korea adds another layer of complexity. Having failed to resolve the nuclear issue in his first term, he has shifted to a more conciliatory tone toward Pyongyang, a stance that contrasts with his pressure tactics on allies. For President Lee Jae Myung, the challenge is to engage a counterpart widely regarded as a master tactician in high-stakes negotiations, armed with a list of agenda items that place South Korea on the defensive from the outset.

Trump’s strategy rests on three main pillars. First, he constrains his counterpart’s options well before formal talks begin. Instead of starting from a neutral position, he imposes a measure — such as a 25 percent tariff — and then frames the discussion around how much he might be willing to roll it back. This forces the other side into a reactive posture, considering only the extent of their concessions. In the current context, Washington has already set its markers with the tariff rate and the proposed tenfold hike in defense costs. Seoul, by contrast, has placed no equivalent conditions on the United States, even in tariff talks where the zero-percent rate for American goods under the Korea-U.S. FTA served as the baseline.

Second, Trump takes advantage of the human tendency to avoid losses more than to pursue gains. Behavioral economics shows that people feel the pain of losing what they already have more strongly than the satisfaction of acquiring something new. By presenting scenarios in which refusing his terms could lead to severe consequences, Trump leverages his counterpart’s instinct to protect existing benefits. South Korea, which has enjoyed extensive economic and security advantages from the U.S. alliance since World War II, has far more to lose from a rupture in ties than Washington does. For the United States, the risks of a strained alliance are less immediate — more about the possibility of allies drawing closer to China or a weakening of American influence in the Indo-Pacific over time, rather than direct short-term costs.

Third, Trump prefers bilateral negotiations and shuns multilateral frameworks, which can dilute his leverage. He has criticized the WTO and even declared the start of a “Trump Round” to replace the Uruguay Round, signaling his intent to bypass established multilateral structures. While countries facing his demands could, in theory, form coalitions to counter him, in practice, few can take that risk. China did so in April, imposing retaliatory tariffs of up to 125 percent and ultimately securing a temporary truce. South Korea, however, sits in a far more constrained position — tied by its security alliance with the United States, wary of alienating China, and facing interconnected trade, security and regional strategy concerns.

Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Cho Hyun (L) meets with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio (R) at the U.S. Department of State on July 31, 2025 in Washington, DC. The meeting comes after U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Wednesday a 15% tariff on imports from South Korea, down from the original 25% he had proposed. [AFP/YONHAP]

It is uncertain how well prepared President Lee is for this encounter. His political career has been rooted in domestic affairs, and he has had limited opportunities to demonstrate his understanding of the complex international issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Expecting major breakthroughs from this summit may be unrealistic given the unfavorable agenda and the skill of his counterpart. Still, if Lee returns from the meeting having gained a deeper grasp of the realities of a rapidly changing global order, that in itself would be valuable.

Such an outcome could help shift his focus from the immediate battles of domestic politics to the broader strategic horizon. Recognizing the constraints and opportunities of the international stage could provide clearer guidance for Korea’s path forward, even if the first encounter with a seasoned dealmaker like Trump yields more lessons than concrete gains.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom staff.