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Who will catch the spies if counterintelligence is weakened?

Published: 01 Aug. 2025, 00:02

Kang Ju-an

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

When President Lee Jae Myung recently ordered a special promotion for a military officer who had refused to follow unlawful instructions during the Dec. 3 martial law, many in Korea were reminded of the Defense Counterintelligence Command (DCIC). If former President Yoon Suk Yeol, now detained at the Seoul Detention Center, were asked which unit he resented most, many believe he would point to the DCIC. Yoon had appointed a high school junior, Yeo In-hyung, as its commander, and during the crisis the unit was tasked with arresting Lee Jae Myung, then the Democratic Party leader and now president.

Defense Counterintelligence Commander Yeo In-hyung testifies at the Constitutional Court on Feb. 4. [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT]

Yet the behavior of DCIC officers under martial law was unusual. While troops from the Special Warfare Command and Capital Defense Command broke into the National Assembly and cut power in symbolic compliance, many DCIC officers lingered at convenience stores and rest areas. Testimonies suggest that they were quietly resisting orders to arrest politicians. One team leader who refused to comply was reportedly beaten by a superior before retreating with his squad to eat instant noodles rather than storm the Assembly.

To the pro-martial-law faction, this looked like incompetence. But a retired officer familiar with the unit described DCIC agents as “formidable when hunting spies.” Had they pursued their mission with the same intensity used in counterespionage operations, he said, different politicians might be behind bars today.

As the fallout from martial law continues, accountability is reaching the DCIC. Former Commander Yeo has been arrested twice, and officers who oversaw the attempted arrests and seizure of election servers now face trial. The government is considering surgery on the organization: stripping away its intelligence collection and investigative powers, leaving only a narrow counterespionage role, with intelligence functions moving to the Defense Intelligence Agency and investigations to the Defense Investigation Bureau.

Experts in anti-espionage work warn that such restructuring could cripple spy-hunting capabilities. Jang Seok-kwang, a former professor at the National Intelligence Academy, said, “Removing intelligence and investigative powers will make counterespionage nearly impossible. External agencies like the National Intelligence Service cannot fully replace the military’s own work.” A former police security officer who once collaborated with the DCIC added, “The unit has unique know-how. Weakening it only benefits North Korea.”

The threats are not hypothetical. North Korean operations remain constant, and Chinese attempts to steal military secrets are growing. Many cases start with routine security checks: Chinese operatives have recruited Korean soldiers to extract classified data from their phones. In a recent example, DCIC officers intercepted a Chinese national entering Jeju to acquire military intelligence. A former DCIC officer warned, “If the unit loses its intelligence and investigative functions, catching spies will become nearly impossible.”

Shifting security inspections to local units could also discourage honest reporting. If a division commander discovers a leak, would he voluntarily alert the DCIC and invite punishment? Past incidents suggest otherwise. In one notable case, when the identities of overseas “black agents” were compromised at the Defense Intelligence Agency, it was the DCIC that deployed investigators, resolved the breach and safely extracted the agents.

Kim Young-woon, head of the National Office of Investigation (NOI)'s cyber terrorism investigation unit speaks during a briefing on the North Korean hacking emails case at the NOI headquarters in Seodaemun District, western Seoul, Seoul on April 15. [NEWS1]

If the goal is to prevent the DCIC from joining future coup attempts, a different approach is needed. Revising the presidential decree that governs martial law is key. Article 7, Section 3 of the Martial Law Command Organization mandates that the head of the Joint Investigation Headquarters be a general from an “intelligence and investigative agency” recommended by the martial law commander — a designation that effectively defaults to the DCIC. Amending this clause to ensure political neutrality is more rational than dismantling its core capabilities.

Accountability for martial law is essential. The commander and officers who participated must be punished, and reforms to prevent political misuse are unavoidable. But if these changes end up benefiting spies and foreign intelligence services, Korea risks performing the wrong kind of surgery.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.