Opcon 'not a negotiation card' as Korea, U.S. discussions on military spending, tariffs escalate
Published: 15 Jul. 2025, 15:45
Updated: 15 Jul. 2025, 18:19
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
![South Korean and U.S. soldiers work together to build a U.S. logistics support bridge at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on July 11, during a joint exercise. [REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/07/15/994c14fc-66c1-4ea5-ac64-4d0d6b4f3f49.jpg)
South Korean and U.S. soldiers work together to build a U.S. logistics support bridge at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on July 11, during a joint exercise. [REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY]
Korea pushed back hard against speculation that it might dangle wartime operational control (Opcon) as a bargaining chip in trade talks with Washington, warning that such theories risk undermining sensitive diplomacy.
“This is not new,” the presidential office said Friday, while National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac stated Sunday that Opcon is “not a negotiation card.”
The sharp denials follow whispers in political and diplomatic circles that the allies could wrap defense issues like Opcon transfer into a broader deal over tariffs, military spending and regional security. The idea has gained renewed urgency as the United States, under the shadow of President Donald Trump’s transactional foreign policy, presses Seoul to shoulder more defense costs.
But Seoul is worried. Even idle talk, officials fear, could destabilize years of delicate planning.
What is Opcon transfer — and where does it stand?
Korea is not launching fresh negotiations on Opcon. Talks over shifting wartime command from the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command to Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff date back nearly two decades.
First agreed in 2006 under President Roh Moo-hyun, the transfer was originally set for April 2012. But rising tensions with North Korea prompted President Lee Myung-bak to push the deadline to December 2015. Then under President Park Geun-hye, the timeline was scrapped altogether in favor of a conditions-based approach.
Since 2017, the Moon Jae-in and Trump administrations cooperated on an “expedited” but still conditional framework, reviewed annually at the Security Consultative Meeting. No new talks have been launched outside that process.
![A helicopter sits on the tarmac at Camp Humphreys, a U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on July 9. [NEWS1]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/07/15/4703f491-8893-4a6f-81f5-e438e664edd3.jpg)
A helicopter sits on the tarmac at Camp Humphreys, a U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on July 9. [NEWS1]
Is Opcon on the table in the ongoing security and tariff discussions?
Largely, no. The South Korean government insists Opcon transfer is a "longstanding issue" predating current trade and security discussions. Present talks focus more on Washington pressing Seoul to raise its defense spending to 5 percent of its GDP, up from the current 2.3 percent. Still, as with any diplomatic negotiation, agendas can expand quickly.
Has South Korea met the conditions to take back wartime control?
Not yet. The allies laid out three broad conditions: Seoul must develop the military capabilities to lead combined defense, the alliance must demonstrate an ability to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats comprehensively and the regional security environment must support a stable transition.
At the core is whether South Korea can command theater operations and lead the combined defense in wartime. Beyond that, the two sides conduct separate evaluations of the security situation at the prospective point of transfer. Joint drills serve as a kind of “mock exam” each year, but South Korea has yet to meet the necessary conditions.
![A U.S. soldier salutes the South Korean and U.S. flags during a rotation brigade transfer of authority ceremony at Camp Casey in Dongducheon, Gyeonggi, on June 18. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/07/15/41a44faa-116b-49dc-8b72-c5647427652a.jpg)
A U.S. soldier salutes the South Korean and U.S. flags during a rotation brigade transfer of authority ceremony at Camp Casey in Dongducheon, Gyeonggi, on June 18. [YONHAP]
Could the allies transfer Opcon even if conditions aren’t met?
Under the current agreement, no. The conditions-based approach involves detailed, quantifiable criteria. That is why talk among some lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Party (DP) of revising domestic laws doesn’t align with the actual bilateral framework.
In theory, the allies could agree to an early handover, but that risks skipping critical assessments. The U.S. Congress has also placed guardrails: the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act recently approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee prohibits reducing U.S. forces on the peninsula or proceeding with Opcon transfer until the defense secretary certifies such steps serve U.S. national interests.
Was Opcon transfer part of President Lee Jae Myung’s campaign pledges?
Yes. The DP’s 21st general election platform listed “pursuing wartime operational control transfer on the solid foundation of the South Korea-U.S. alliance.” During his presidential campaign in 2022, Lee called for an accelerated Opcon transfer but clarified in a debate in February that year that he never meant to do so unconditionally. As a lawmaker on the National Defense Committee, he once argued that “no other independent nation entrusts or shares military sovereignty like we do.”
Although Lee didn’t directly raise Opcon during the 2025 election campaign, he showed continued interest. At a National Security Council meeting last Thursday, he reportedly asked about the history and concept behind Opcon transfer.
![South Korean soldiers walk past a monument depicting the march of the UN Task Force Smith at Jukmiryeong Peace Park in Osan, Gyeonggi, on June 24, a day before the 75th anniversary of the Korean War. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/07/15/1ad8ad45-e7f9-46f8-b584-fdb8ac9bde13.jpg)
South Korean soldiers walk past a monument depicting the march of the UN Task Force Smith at Jukmiryeong Peace Park in Osan, Gyeonggi, on June 24, a day before the 75th anniversary of the Korean War. [YONHAP]
Is Opcon a useful bargaining chip?
That depends. The Trump administration has sought to apply its “strategic flexibility” approach to U.S. forces stationed overseas, aiming to reduce U.S. costs and shift more of the burden onto allies, all while using forward-deployed forces to pressure China. In this context, even downsizing U.S. troops in Korea could be framed as reasonable if Washington believes Seoul can handle contingencies alone.
The Trump administration’s isolationist streak, with its emphasis on "Korea should be paying for their military," could make Washington more open to Opcon transfer. But experts caution that turning Opcon into a negotiation lever is risky. Without fully meeting the agreed conditions, a premature transfer could create security gaps.
BY YOO JEE-HYE, LEE KEUN-PYUNG [[email protected]]
with the Korea JoongAng Daily
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