Two wars, one uneasy ally: Trump increases pressure on Seoul to contribute in Iran, Ukraine

Washington's public displeasure about Seoul's lack of involvement in Hormuz and Kyiv has put it in an awkward position between prioritizing its own security and keeping its ally on its side.

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U.S. President Donald Trump disembarks Air Force One at Morristown Airport on Sept. 4 in Morristown in New Jersey.
U.S. President Donald Trump disembarks Air Force One at Morristown Airport in Morristown, New Jersey, on Sept. 4.

Is South Korea in U.S. President Donald Trump’s bad books? The country could soon find itself drawn into two overseas wartime fronts as Trump presses it for military contributions in both the Strait of Hormuz and Ukraine.

During his first term, Trump accused the South of “free riding” on U.S. security might. In his second, the rhetoric has expanded to include the wars involving Tehran and Kyiv, as well as trade issues, such as South Korean investment in the United States.

Regardless of whether the arguments are far-fetched, the U.S. president’s seemingly relentless and targeted demands have raised an unsettling question: Is Trump really targeting South Korea, or is this all an unlucky coincidence?

Deployment to Hormuz

A motorboat travels past commercial vessels anchored in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, on Sept. 6.
A motorboat travels past commercial vessels anchored in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, on Sept. 6.

The South Korean government has seemingly prioritized discussions about whether to deploy troops to the Strait of Hormuz after the United States unilaterally reduced the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint drill in mid-August. 

At the time, Trump wrote on Truth Social that he would suspend the exercise to preserve his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, in turn, responded on X that he “respects [U.S.] President Trump’s determination and agrees with his pursuit.”

Lee’s remarks seem aimed at preserving Trump’s standing, despite his remarks openly sidelining the South — a U.S. ally. They also appear to serve a broader diplomatic strategy to make Washington the “peacemaker” and Seoul the “pacemaker” regarding Pyongyang.

However, South Korea’s efforts to accommodate Trump without publicly challenging his demands were met with silence.

In fact, after Lee’s statement, Trump made seemingly grudging comments about NATO and the South during a Fox News interview on Aug. 30.

“I think you have to remember this stuff,” Trump said as he recalled asking NATO and South Korea to help with Iran.

Republic of Korea Navy's maritime patrol aircraft is seen in a file photo.
Korean Navy's maritime patrol aircraft

The South Korea-U.S. alliance was already showing signs of strain over Seoul’s investment in Washington. Against that backdrop, a possible deployment to the strait has emerged as a way to ease Trump’s frustration and offer a tangible show of the South’s commitment.

“Several countries, including Britain and France, have already sent ships to the region or are operating there,” a senior Blue House official said on Friday. “We are discussing the matter.”

A Navy logistics support ship and maritime patrol aircraft are some of the options under review. Officials have also reportedly been considering sending an explosive ordnance disposal team from the Navy’s Special Warfare Flotilla.

While sending maritime patrol aircraft would carry fewer risks for Seoul, the question is whether Trump would consider that enough.

Deploying a warship, however, would heighten safety risks to South Korean troops and fuel opposition at home. The larger the deployment, the stronger that opposition is likely to be.

Operators move into position to prepare for the launch of a Cheongung-II surface-to-air missile during a live-fire interception drill near the Yellow Sea on Nov. 6, 2024.

Cheongung-II for Ukraine: Why now?

The pressure does not stop at Hormuz.

Trump turned his attention to Ukraine on Friday, sharing a Washington Post column on Truth Social that urges Seoul to provide Kyiv with Cheongung-II interceptor missiles.

“Trump is already rightly furious with South Korea for refusing to assist in the Strait of Hormuz,” the column reads. “There would be no better way for Seoul to fix that relationship than to make a stopgap transfer to Kyiv and thereby take the pressure off the United States to provide Ukraine with interceptors.”

Columnist Marc Thiessen pointed to what he called a contradiction in the South’s position: It says that it cannot legally sell weapons to countries at war, yet it is supplying the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the same interceptors as it fights Iran.

Since the post came as U.S. special presidential envoy Steve Witkoff and other officials prepared to visit Russia for talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, it was seen as an attempt to strengthen Washington's hand in cease-fire discussions with Moscow while shifting more of the military burden onto Seoul. Behind it was Trump’s longstanding view that South Korea gets more from the U.S. security alliance than it gives.

Seoul’s dilemma is that the Cheongung-II is a core component of South Korea’s Air and Missile Defense network. Expanding the deployment of Cheongung-II batteries at home is also considered essential to the government’s goal of regaining wartime operational control within Lee’s term.

Early in the Iran war, Middle Eastern buyers of the Cheongung-II, including the UAE, asked the South to divert batteries earmarked for its own military and deliver them first. Seoul, determined to protect its own air defense buildup, refused.

Trump has not directly asked the South to provide Cheongung-II missiles. But the episode fits a broader pattern: He has repeatedly pushed to see what more South Korea is prepared to offer.


Time for a decision

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a town hall meeting held at the Blue House in Jongno District, central Seoul, on Sept. 4.
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a town hall meeting at the Blue House in Jongno District, central Seoul, on Sept. 4.

For Seoul, its calculations increasingly center on containing the fallout. Participation in the Middle East conflict has become a necessary step to keep tensions with Washington from deepening.

Seoul’s Ministry of National Defense and working-level agencies have been reviewing deployable assets and a motion seeking parliamentary approval for the deployment since the first half of this year.

“Washington clearly signaled that there could be consequences if Seoul does not contribute in the Strait of Hormuz,” a high-ranking South Korean official said.

The South has largely settled on sending assets for “noncombat search operations” near the Strait of Hormuz in support of multinational forces including the United States, Britain and France. Working-level preparations are reportedly complete.

The final call now rests with President Lee.

Moving ahead with a deployment as his approval ratings weaken would invite resistance from the ruling camp and his political base. But shelving or delaying it carries a different risk, as no one knows how far Trump’s frustration with Seoul could spread. That is why officials say that the decision has now reached “the president’s desk.”


BY LEE YU-JUNG [[email protected]]

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.